The Somewhat Untrue Myth of Ancient Peace

Joe Rogan interviewed Cassie Coppersmith on JRE #2528. In the snippet at 5:30:

Joe: “And this is all… That’s so interesting that… the people that probably built it first had…”

Cassie: “No interest in war.”

Joe: “No interest in war. Or at least had a very enlightened perspective.”

Cassie: “It does support… the idea of… human consciousness having reached its peak 12,000 years ago and has been slowly devolving ever since. You can see that in the imagery in some of these temples plain as day. So, yeah, there’ s a lot of images of war scenes on… all of the outer layers of Angkor Wat, but in the middle it’s totally different. Same in India.”

The idea that ancient society was “enlightened” in its views toward war and pacifism is based on two phenomena: 1) the lack of artwork depicting mass warfare in places like ancient Indian and Cambodian ruins, neolithic Europe etc., contrasted with the warfare reliefs of Rome, Egypt, Greece, Babylon, etc., and 2) general lack of mass graves. Riane Eisler made this same claim in her Chalice and the Blade (1987), claiming that before the “patriarchy” overran Europe there was a partnership system between men and women. She’s correct in the sense that matrilineal society is only “matriarchal” insofar as women are channels for inheritance and clan organization. She claims that such a “partnership” system was peaceful. On page 28 she writes:

“But the direction of cultural evolution – including whether a social system is warlike or peaceful – depends on whether we have a partnership or a dominator social structure.”

In reality, matrilineal society has two checks against (massive) warfare, which are interrelated. 1) Inter-tribal marriage is the rule, usually with the husband being the one who moves to the wife’s domicile (matrilocality). Among the Trobrianders, the wives moved to the husbands’ domicile (patrilocality) but because kinship passed through the woman, the children grew up as foreigners in the father’s town and, as Malinowski described it, their true kinsmen were off in their mother’s home village. Either way, under matrilineal descent, either the husbands or the children live as aliens in their town. They are required by law to marry outside of their clan, creating a network of clans related by marital bonds. But was ancient, matrilineal society free of warfare? The idea is absurd. The marriage contract itself testifies to this. A father always preferred that his daughter’s husband move into his clan so that, if he becomes abusive with her, they can avenge her. If he’s powerful enough to induce her into his home, he may have to pay a higher brideprice, and the distance must not be so far to prohibit the wife’s brothers from avenging her if she’s abused. The Yanomami reportedly beat their wives brutally. In Chagnon’s book, his hero Kaobawä has to intervene constantly to prevent domestic violence, because such violence brings retribution from the wife’s clan, which can become war.

The other check against massive warfare is 2) limitations on technology. Matrilineal society rarely climbs above the level of the Stone Age, at least regarding weaponry. Leonard Shlain explained this in a kind of backwards way in The Alphabet Versus the Goddess, claiming that once “the patriarchy” sinks its teeth in, warfare increases. Nowhere does he bother explaining what produces “the patriarchy,” though. As I detailed in my Kin and Caliber article, matrilineal society maintains a wide network of inter-tribal marriages with an inheritance system requiring goods be transported from men to their sisters’ children in other villages. This stops the creation of large structures like forges and mines. Without these, you have no bronze or iron, and you have no fortresses. Lacking one negates the need for the other. Matrilineal society instead can’t enact mass warfare, nor does it need to. Instead, its violence is always punitive and retributive. Adultery and incest are punished with death, rape and insult are punished with kidnapping of women and children, and theft is punished with raiding. These are perceived as constant a threat as modern nuclear war, though far more common. The Yanomami are paranoid about raiders, and they have reason to be. We are paranoid about the patriarchy going to nuclear war, which never happened after the bombing of Japan.

If ancient society was so peaceful, then nobody would have worried about losing their women in raids, nobody would have worried about their women being abused in their marriages, and nobody would have worried about retributive murder. Yet these things were constants. I’m not sure on what authority Ms. Coppersmith is making her claim, but the historical record simply confirm it.

I talk about this issue and others in my book If These Fists Could Talk: A Stuntman’s Unflinching Take on Violence which you can get on Amazon.

One response to “The Somewhat Untrue Myth of Ancient Peace”

  1. thoughtfullyf7cf27d0e8 Avatar
    thoughtfullyf7cf27d0e8

    If I may offer a structural addition to your thesis by framing ROBA through game theory and the mechanics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, I think it reveals why human violence is fundamentally un-containable by liberal models of “cooperation”. I suspect that pushing for cooperation is like trying to defend the name on your ID card. You have no idea how, and the more you try it, the more guilty you feel, and everything erupts.

    Liberal game theory argues that repeated interactions through the strategy of “Tit-for-Tat”. But his only works when strikes are non-lethal. The first defection ceases to be a warning strike and becomes total liquidation. Because the asymmetric cost of being defected on is absolute annihilation, no subject under the pressure of the unknown will risk testing if “cooperation” works. The ethical choice would be to dictate censoring your guilt, and potentially allow yourself to die, but save an entire group. But there is a catch: the ethical choice works only if the enemy does not know it in advance. If the enemy knows in advance, it might take the opportunity to catch me with my pants down, which unfortunately means that you will have to participate in the defection either way.

    We don’t see this in animals do we, especially in primates? Defection in the human domain is driven out of simple malice but the terrifying opacity of the Other’s subjectivity (“What does he really want from me?”). Even if both parties desperately desire peace, the un-bridgeable gap between two minds turns non-defection into a suicidal act under pressure. If you have seen the film JSA by Park Chan-wook, you would know what a pressure cooker being caught actually means. A tiny sound is enough for you to make a small shift with your hand which can unfortunately be read as an attack even if you consciously did not intend it.

    The modern state attempts to solve this by introducing a Leviathan, a third-party referee with a monopoly on violence. It relies on the perpetual threat of the internal void to force both subjects into submission. Its entire patronizing idea is rooted in its own guilt. The more Yugoslavia lasted, the more guilty was Tito, the more he could not see what he needed to do likely.

    If liberal “cooperation” is a fantasy that inevitably collapses into pre-emptive strikes or sovereign tyranny, the solution isn’t trying to force two subjects into the same room to build a “universal family”. True deferral requires castrating the dilemma entirely through absolute distance. What I mean is not spatial distance but lack of guilt. The more liberals emphasize gay rights, the more guilty gay people feel precisely because free speech tends to foster religious fundamentalism, and the more liberals get points.

    But is such a systemic break even possible?

    On a small scale, I think so. The fantasy that sustains my granny’s burden of living on top of a hill is lamenting a lost land down there due to Yugoslav nationalization. The catch is likely that if I truly disturbed her fantasy that she will only then fall into a deep depression. Thus, I castrate myself from any notion of a humanitarian intervention. If I had no capacity to do so, I would likely be taken hold of moralizing guilt, and never be able to realize the ethical weight of potentially disturbing the other.

    In any case, just like in JSA, we have no idea who we are dealing with across the table, and maybe we should avoid trying in the first place, and we should avoid falling into the temptation that there is this cooperation that the Prisoner’s Dilemma loses.

    No wonder the corporations love it: sink the app in ads, you hate ads, offer the subscription that cleans them because they target your desire for a lost “whole”.

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